Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co.: The Ending of a Trend in Successor Liability or a Minor Setback for Product Liability Claimants? by Green, Bryan J.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co.: The
Ending of a Trend in Successor Liability or a Minor
Setback for Product Liability Claimants?
Bryan J. Green
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Green, Bryan J. (1988) "Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co.: The Ending of a Trend in Successor Liability or
a Minor Setback for Product Liability Claimants?," Akron Law Review: Vol. 21 : Iss. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol21/iss2/6
FLAUGHER v. CONE AUTOMATIC MACHINE CO.
THE ENDING OF A TREND IN SUCCESSOR LIABILITY OR
A MINOR SETBACK FOR PRODUCT LIABILITY
CLAIMANTS?
The struggle to define the outer boundaries of "successor corporation"
product liability has consumed more than a decade of judicial resources.' Tradi-
tionally, a corporation purchasing the assets of another corporation assumes
the seller's liabilities if any of the following four conditions are met: (1) the
purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the liabilities;
(2) the purchase constitutes a de facto merger or consolidation; (3) the pur-
chasing corporation is a mere continuation of the seller; or, (4) the transfer
of assets constitutes a fraudulent attempt to avoid liabilities.2 Many courts3 and
commentators # deeming the traditional rule unfair to product liability claimants,5
responded by either expanding the application of one or more of the four tradi-
tional exceptions to successor non-liability,6 or by embracing a fifth exception,
popularly known as the "product-line" exception 7
Primary judicial expansion of the traditional exceptions has taken place
under the de facto merger and continuation areas.8 Historically, the de facto
merger exception required that the consideration received by the seller for its
corporate assets consist exclusively of successor corporation stock Modern
courts insist only that there be a continuity of shareholders and that the con-
1See Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal.
3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d
811 (1981); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); George v. Parke-Davis,
107 Wash. 2d 584, 733 P.2d 507 (1987).
2 Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 340-41, 431 A.2d at 815.
3See, e.g., Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 341, 431 A.2d at 815-16; Turner, 397 Mich. at 418-24, 244 N.W.2d at 886-93.
4 See, e.g., Phillips, Product Line Continuity And Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906
(1983); Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority Of Statutory Reform To Protect Product Liability
Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Green]; Aylward & Aylward, Successor
Liability for Defective Products - Misplaced Responsibility, 13 STETSON L. REV. 555 (1984); Hyman,
The Liability of Successor Corporations For Defective Products Of A Predecessor Corporation - A Switch
From Corporate To Tort Law, 10 S.U. L. REv. 165 (1984).
5 When a products liability claimant is injured by a defective product, often the product's manufacturer
has already sold all its assets and gone out of existence. The claimant's sole recourse is suing the suc-
cessor corporation under one of the four traditional exceptions, essentially designed to protect the rights
of commercial creditors and dissenting shareholders. Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co., 30 Ohio
St. 3d 60, 68, 507 N.E.2d 331, 339 (1987) (Sweeney, J., dissenting, quoting Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 341, 431
A.2d at 815-16).
6 E.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965
(1975). Turner, 397 Mich. at 429-30, 244 N.W.2d at 895-96; Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F2d 1145 (1st
Cir. 1974).
'E.g., Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825; George, 107 Wash. 2d at 588, 733 P.2d at 510.
8Green, supra note 4, at 24; Note, Expanding The Products Liability Of Successor Corporations, 27 Hastings
L.J. 1305 (1976).
9 See, Turner, 397 Mich. at 422-23, 244 N.W.2d at 880. See, e.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379
F Supp. 797, 801-02 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Green, supra note 4, at 25 n. 37.
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sideration paid include shares of stock.' 0
The traditional continuation exception requires proof that the successor
corporation is a continuation of the corporate entity in all functional aspects."
Under the expanded view, the courts insist only that the seller and buyer share
significant features, including common officers, directors, employees or share-
holders.' 2 Some courts have chosen to eliminate the requirement that the seller
corporation dissolve immediately after the sale of assets. 3
The "product-line" exception originated in Ray v. Alad Corp.'4 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that a transferee of a company's operating assets assumes
strict tort liability for defective units within the same product line as previous-
ly manufactured and distributed by the transferor manufacturer.' 5 Ray has been
interpreted as requiring three additional factors: (1) that there be a virtual destruc-
tion of plaintiffs remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the suc-
cessor's purchase of the business; (2) that the successor be capable of assum-
ing the original manufacturer's risk-spreading role; and, (3) that the successor
benefit from the goodwill of the original manufacturer. 6
This Casenote analyzes the recent Ohio Supreme Court decision in Flaugher
v. Cone Automatic Machine Co."7 to evaluate both its impact on the field of
successor corporate liability and the opinion's fundamental soundness. The
Flaugher court identified three issues: (1) whether the facts demanded applica-
tion of one of the traditional exceptions to the rule of successor non-liability,
(2) whether the court should adopt the "product line" theory of liability, and
(3) whether the defendant corporations had a duty to warn plaintiff of the alleged
defect in the machine which injured her.'8 The court affirmed the lower court's
decision by answering each issue in the negative.
THE FACTS
On April 24, 1979, plaintiff-appellant Carla Flaugher was injured by an
eight-spindle Conomatic bar and screw machine.19 Defendant Cone Automatic
Machine Company, Inc. (Cone I) manufactured the Nu Conomatic machine
10 1n Re Asbestos Litigation (Bell), 517 A.2d 697, 699 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Savini v. Kent Machine
Works, Inc., 525 F Supp. 711, 716 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
"1 Green, supra note 4, at 25; Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 342, 431 A.2d at 823.
12Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 64-65, 507 N.E.2d at 336.
13 See Knapp, 506 F.2d at 361.
1419 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
15Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
16See Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1546, 1550-55, 236 Cal. Rptr. 70, 74-78 (1987);
George, 107 Wash. 2d at 588, 733 P.2d at 510.
1730 Ohio St. 3d at 60, 507 N.E.2d at 331.
181d. at 61-62, 507 N.E.2d at 333-34.
'
9 1d. at 60, 507 N.E.2d at 333.
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in 1953.20 Cone I no longer exists and is not a party to this appeal. 2' On July
19, 1963, Pneumo Corporation purchased Cone I's stock and assets. 22 Pneumo
Corporation then dissolved Cone I and immediately created a new corpora-
tion, Cone Automatic Machine Co., Inc. (Cone II).23 Cone II held the "Cone"
name and associated rights as a non-functional holding company.2 4
After purchasing Cone I, Pneumo Corporation combined its manufactur-
ing capabilities with those of Blanchard Machine Company and Springfield
Grinding Machine Company, creating a new enterprise: Pneumo Dynamics
Machine Tool Group (PDMTG)25 In December, 1972, Cone-Blanchard Machine
Company (Cone-Blanchard) purchased PDMTG's assets and Cone II's stock
for approximately eleven million dollars.26
The plaintiffs complaint named Cone I, Cone II, Pneumo Corporation
and Cone-Blanchard as defendants ? 7 Carla Flaugher alleged that she sustained
injuries as a direct and proximate result of the defendants' negligent design and
manufacture of the Conomatic, and their negligent failure to warn of its dangerous
condition.28 The trial court sustained Cone I's motion to dismiss for plaintiffs
failure to state a sufficient claim.29 The trial court also granted the Pneumo
Corporation and Cone II motions for summary judgment, reasoning that neither
corporation fell within the traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor
non-liability 0 The trial court refused to apply the "product-line" theory of
liability,3' reasoning that even if the theory were adopted in Ohio, the facts
rendered it inapplicable because the predecessor entity, Pneumo Corporation,
remained a viable business concern 3 2 Because appellees had no notice of the
purported defect, no liability could arise through any failure in their alleged
2 0 d"
21 Id.
2 2 Pneumo Corporation was then known as Pneumo Dynamics Corporation. Id. The trial court dismissed
the action against Pneumo Dynamics because the applicable statute of limitations had run. Flaugher v.
Automatic Machine Co., No. CA84-05-040, slip op. at 10 (Ohio App. 1986). The dismissal went unchal-
lenged, and Pneumo Dynamics was not a party to this appeal.
2 3Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 60, 507 N.E.2d 333.
241d.
2 51d. at 60-61, 507 N.E.2d at 333.
2 61d. at 61, 507 N.E.2d at 333.
27Appellant Carla Flaugher's husband, Bradley Flaugher, was also a party to this action. Id.
281d.
29 Cone I was a Vermont corporation. Applicable Vermont law bars claims against dissolved corporations
where the claim did not exist prior to dissolution. Id.
30Id.
3 1 See supra note 4.
32This argument apparently relies on the later interpretation given Ray v. Alad Corp. For example, in
Lundell, the California Court of Appeals followed Ray by requiring a "virtual destruction of plaintiffs
remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business" before
the law may impose strict liability. Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 190 Cal. App. 3d at 1550, 236
Cal. Rptr. at 74 (quoting Ray 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580).
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duty to warn appellant of the defect in the Conomatic.33
The court of appeals substantially adopted the reasoning of the trial court
in affirming the decision.34 The cause was brought before the Ohio Supreme
Court following appellant's motion to certify the record.
35
ANALYSIS
The court first determined whether either Cone II or Cone-Blanchard fell
within a recognized exception to the traditional rule of successor non-liability.3 6
Stating that "[t]he general rule in products liability is that a successor corpora-
tion's amenability to suit will depend on the nature of the transaction which
gave rise to the change in ownership,"3 7 the court continued by reciting the
traditional exceptions to the rule of successor non-liability.3 s The court rea-
soned that because the purchase of PDMTG and Cone II by Cone-Blanchard
was a "sale of assets" transaction, Cone-Blanchard could not be held liable
unless one of the four exceptions applied.3 9 The appellants conceded that the
second and fourth exceptions were inapplicable. Therefore, the court exam-
ined Cone II and Cone-Blanchard's potential liability under the first and third
exceptions."
Under the first exception, appellants argued that the purchase agreement
between Pneumo Corporation and Cone-Blanchard was ambiguous as to whether
Cone-Blanchard intended to assume Cone I's tort liability." The court found
that the purchase agreement unambiguously stated that Cone-Blanchard assumed
only those liabilities incurred by Pneumo Corporation. 2 Further, the court deter-
mined that section 5.2 of the purchase agreement clearly indemnified Cone-
Blanchard against any liabilities predating the purchase agreement and not ex-
3Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 61, 507 N.E.2d at 333.
34 1Id.
351d.
36 1d.
71d. at 62, 507 N.E.2d at 334.
381d.
39 Id. The traditional rule has been greatly criticized as being "inconsistent with the rapidly developing
principles of strict liability in tort and unresponsive to the legitimate interests of the products liability
plaintiff." Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 341, 431 A.2d at 815.
4Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 62, 507 N.E.2d at 334. Appellants did not argue the "de facto merger"
exception because even under the liberal view, courts have insisted that the consideration include shares
of stock. In Re Asbestos Litigation (Bell), 517 A.2d 697, 699 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986). The consideration
paid by Cone-Blanchard was approximately eleven million dollars, which apparently included no Cone-
Blanchard corporate stock. See Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 61, 507 N.E.2d at 333.
41Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 62, 507 N.E.2d at 334.
4 2 Section 6.2 of the purchase agreement provided in pertinent part that".. Buyer shall assume any liability
of Seller for any damages . . . arising or alleged to arise ... out of the negligence or willful misconduct
of Seller in the manufacture of such machines or parts therefor . (Emphasis added.) Id. at 62-63,
507 N.E.2d at 334 n.2.
[Vol. 21:2
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pressly assumed by Cone-Blanchard. 43
The court continued by discussing the third exception to successor non-
liability, the so-called "mere continuation" exception. 4 After stating that the
traditional "mere continuation" exception required both continuation of the
business operation and the corporate entity, the court noted that even under
the expanded view Cone-Blanchard could not be considered a continuation of
either Cone I or Pneumo Corporation4 5 The court substantially based its con-
clusion on two key facts: (1) Cone-Blanchard had no directors or officers in
common with either Cone I or Pneumo Corporation, and (2) Pneumo Cor-
poration continued to be a viable business concern long after the 1972 transfer
6
The court then looked to appellee Cone II, concluding that neither the
"assumption of liability" nor the "mere continuation" exceptions applied.' 7
First, no document had been disclosed which could be considered an assump-
tion of liability by Cone II of Cone I's defectively-manufactured equipment.' 8
Second, Cone II was a holding corporation, an entirely inactive corporate shell
possessing only the Cone name and associated rights.' 9 Consequently, Cone
II could not be considered a "mere continuation" of Cone I, which had
employees, a place of business and a product line.5°
The court went on to address whether the "product-line" theory should
be adopted by Ohio and applied to the facts presented. 5' The court determined
that the "product-line" exception's "far reaching and radical departure from
traditional principles" and its "potentially devastating burden on business
transfers" dictated that its adoption would require legislative action rather than
judicial activism 52
The third and final issue addressed by the court was whether Cone-
Blanchard had a duty to warn appellant of the alleged defect in the Conomatic.
3
The court held that "a successor corporation has no duty to warn of defects
4
- Section 5.2 of the purchase agreement provided in pertinent part that "Seller shall indemnify and hold
Buyer harmless and shall assume the defense of any claim being asserted after the Effective Date against
. . . the Machine Tool Group . . . arising out of any transaction entered into, or any state of existing.
prior to the Effective Date . ... Id. at 63. 507 N.E.2d at 335, n.3.
44Id. at 64. 507 N.E.2d at 336.
4
-SId. at 64-65, 507 N.E.2d at 335-36. See supra note 12.
46Id. at 65, 507 N.E.2d at 336. As the majority points out, many courts applying the "mere continuation"
exception have required that the predecessor be dissolved or liquidated after the transfer of assets. E.g.,
Turner, 397 Mich. at 419-20, 244 N.W.2d at 887-88. Contra Knapp, 506 E2d at 361; Trimper v. Bruno-
Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
47 Flaugher, at 65, 507 N.E.2d at 336.
48 Id.
49id.
5 0 1d.
51Id. at 65-66, 507 N.E.2d at 336.
21d. at 66-67, 507 N.E.2d at 337. The majority felt that legislative action was more appropriate due to
the legislature's "comprehensive machinery for public input and debate." Id. at 66, 507 N.E.2d at 337.
53 1d. at 67. 507 N.E.2d at 337.
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in products manufactured by its predecessor unless the successor is shown to
have had pre-existing knowledge, actual or constructive, of the particular defect
alleged to exist." 54 Although Cone-Blanchard knew that an alleged defect in
a different machine had previously caused a similar injury, the court found
this finding insufficient to justify imposing liability.5
In his dissent, Justice Sweeney asserted that the majority's adherence to
the traditional rule ignored both the rule's business law foundations and total
irrelevance to the policy considerations underlying products liability law.5 6 Justice
Sweeney also opined that adoption of the "product-line" rule would "advance
the protections afforded innocent third parties for injuries resulting from en-
counters with defective products. 57
Justice Sweeney attacked the majority's conclusion that adoption of the
"product line" theory required legislative action.5 8 He pointed out that this case
was one of first impression in Ohio and that both the "traditional" and the
"product-line" theories were common-law concepts requiring equal treatment5 9
Therefore, the majority could not reject one concept as necessitating legislative
action while in the same breath judicially adopt the other.60
Justice Sweeney also challenged the majority's other justification for refusing
to adopt the "product-line" theory: that its adoption "would cast a potentially
devastating burden on business transfers and would convert sales of corporate
assets into traps for the unwary.' 6' He emphasized that the rule embraced by
the Flaugher majority placed the burden of loss on Ohio citizens suffering in-
juries inflicted by defective products, rather than on business enterprises
benefiting from access to Ohio commerce.6 2 Justice Sweeney further stressed
that "such an inequitable allocation of burdens and benefits is both unjust and
inexcusable." 63 Justice Sweeney advocated the adoption of the "product-line"
theory, concluding that it satisfied all the policy considerations64 for imposing
liability on the entity responsible for the quality of a particular product.65
54M. at 67, 507 N.E.2d at 338.
55Id.
161(j. at 68. 507 N.E.2d at 338-39. These policy considerations include: (I) the manufacturer's superior
ability to protect itself and bear the costs: (2) the manufacturer's launching the product into the channels
of trade: (3) the manufacturer's violating the representation of safety implicit in putting the product into
the stream of commerce: (4) the manufacturer's sole ability to improve the product's quality; and, (5)
the negligence of the manufacturer's employees. Id. (citing Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154
(lst Cir. 1974)).
5 7Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 68, 507 N.E.2d at 338.
5 1d. at 72. 507 N.E.2d at 341.
5 9
1/.
60 Id.
6Id.; see also supra note 52.
6 2 /d. at 72, 507 N.E.2d at 341.
63 Id.
64See supra note 39.
6 SFlaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 70, 507 N.E.2d at 340.
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In dissent, Justice Sweeney contended that the extent to which Cone-
Blanchard was aware or should have been aware of the defects in the machine
involved factual questions which were best resolved by a jury.6 6 Therefore, he
opined, the trial court erred in granting Cone II's and Cone-Blanchard's mo-
tions for summary judgment. 6 7
THE EFFECT OF FLAUGHER
Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co. is the first Ohio Supreme Court
case dealing primarily with the liability of a successor corporation 6 s As such,
Flaugher represents the Court's initial attempt to formulate an Ohio rule poten-
tially impacting significantly on the field of successor corporate liability. How-
ever, the Ohio Supreme Court's decision, due to its lack of exactness and direc-
tion, will have little jurisprudential influence in the area of successor liability.
Unlike other courts,69 the Ohio Supreme Court failed to enunciate clearly
the prerequisites for applying any of the four traditional exceptions to the general
rule of successor non-liability. While discussing the "mere continuation" ex-
ception, the court analyzed both the traditional and expanded versions. Without
expressly adopting either interpretation, the court reviewed the material facts
in light of the expanded view.7 Although of little consequence in the present
case, the court's failure to officially sanction either view may be critical in some
future case involving different facts.71 In such a case, Flaugher will be of little
assistance.
Most importantly, the Flaugher majority declined to take a firm position
on the "product-line" theory.7 2 Most courts have either embraced or rejected
the rule.73 In deferring that decision to the state legislature, the court only
perpetuates the confusion among both successor corporations and product liabili-
ty claimants. Unless and until the Ohio Supreme Court issues clear rules gov-
erning successor corporate liability or the Ohio legislature takes a similar initia-
tive, the Flaugher decision will probably encourage continued litigation of the
issue. Meanwhile, Flaugher will give transferee corporations the advantage in
the game of successor corporate liability.
66 Id. at 72, 507 N.E.2d at 341. Appellants contended that the requisite prior notice of the defect causing
the injury was received by Cone-Blanchard on March 16, 1979, in a summons to defend a Texas lawsuit
by a plaintiff who alleged an injury similar to that suffered by appellant. Id. at 67, 507 N.E. 2d at 337-38.
671d. at 72, 507 N.E.2d at 342.
68In fact, this author could locate only four Ohio cases which referred to the subject of successor liability.
Two of the four cases were unpublished, appellate-level decisions.
69See In Re Asbestos Litigation (Bell), 517 A.2d 697, 699-700 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Ray, 19 Cal. 3d
at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
70 Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 64-65, 507 N.E.2d at 336.
71The applicability of the "mere continuation" exception may well turn on which view the Court finally
chooses to adopt.
72 Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 66-67, 507 N.E.2d at 336-37.
73See, e.g., Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at I1, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582; Young v. Fulton Iron Works
Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. App. 1986).
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CONCLUSION
Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co. illustrates that the court's refusal
to confront directly the issue of successor corporate liability can effectively
deny product liability claimants compensation for injuries caused by a
predecessor manufacturer's allegedly defective products. 74 By holding that the
"product-line" exception to corporate successor non-liability is a matter for
the legislature rather than the courts, the Flaugher decision encourages criticism.
If the "product-line" theory is indeed "far-reaching" and "radical" when
compared to the traditional exceptions, then its adoption should require legislative
action. However, considering how far some courts have expanded the tradi-
tional exceptions to successor corporate non-liability75 the "product-line" ex-
ception is not as "far-reaching" and "radical" as the Flaugher majority asserts.
This comparison, especially when viewed in the context of a clear trend toward
more liberal exceptions to the general rule of successor corporate non-liability,76
puts the Flaugher court's holding on questionable ground. In addition, such
an exercise of judicial restraint is specious at best. Deferral to the legislature
ignores political reality77 does little to assist product liability claimants and,
in practical terms, favors Ohio corporations.
Public policy considerations supporting the extension of strict product liabili-
ty to claimants such as Carla Flaugher 78 and the clear trend toward more liberal
exceptions to the traditional rule of successor corporation non-liability79 in-
dicate that Flaugher was incorrectly decided.80 It may represent the beginning
of a long, perilous journey for the product liability claimant confronted with
a successor corporation defendant.
BRYAN J. GREEN
74By failing to endorse the "product-line" theory in Ohio, the Court has forestalled plaintiffs' only recourse
where a transferor corporation has dissolved prior to plaintiffs' injuries.
75This observation is true especially in the areas of the "de facto merger" and "mere continuation" excep-
tions. See Green, supra note 4, at 23.
76See Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 336, 431 A.2d at 817-19; Green, supra note 4, at 24.
77One commentator who advocates legislative action admits: "Realistically the proposed statute would
confront significant political hurdles. The lobby for long-tail products liability claimants is exceedingly
weak." Green, supra note 4, at 24.
78 Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. 3d at 68, 507 N.E.2d at 338-39.
79See supra note 59.
8 The author disagrees primarily with the Court's holding on the "product-line" issue rather than the
"duty to warn" question or the application of the traditional successor non-liability exceptions.
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